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ABSTRACT
This paper will investigate culture as it pertains to the United States Army Recruiting Command (USAREC). USAREC will be considered exclusively because of its unique mission. It will be argued that USAREC's distinct task of recruiting civilians to serve in an All Volunteer Force (AVF) has produced a culture that is dissimilar to the rest of the Army. Further, it will be argued that this contrast produces significant challenges for the Army recruiters that serve in the command. While USAREC has developed a strategy to confront the challenges of recruiters and it has resolved to change its culture, there are potential disparities in USAREC's plan. This paper will first identify the challenges facing recruiters and then provide evidence that prompts concern for the health of USAREC's culture. Second, USAREC's newly developed strategy for implementing cultural change in order to alleviate the problems will be addressed. Third, using models of organizational culture and studies of the Army as a profession, USAREC's strategy for cultural change will be analyzed to determine if there are any gaps in the plan. The paper will conclude with recommendations for both USAREC and the Army to consider as it implements its strategy for cultural change.
SUBJECT TERMS
All Volunteer Force, Military Marketing its unique mission. It will be argued that USAREC's distinct task of recruiting civilians to serve in an All Volunteer Force (AVF) has produced a culture that is dissimilar to the rest of the Army. Further, it will be argued that this contrast produces significant challenges for the Army recruiters that serve in the command. While USAREC has developed a strategy to confront the challenges of recruiters and it has resolved to change its culture, there are potential disparities in USAREC's plan. This paper will first identify the challenges facing recruiters and then provide evidence that prompts concern for the health of USAREC's culture. Second, USAREC's newly developed strategy for implementing cultural change in order to alleviate the problems will be addressed. Third, using models of organizational culture and studies of the Army as a profession, USAREC's strategy for cultural change will be analyzed to determine if there are any gaps in the plan. The paper will conclude with recommendations for both USAREC and the Army to consider as it implements its strategy for cultural change. The purpose of this paper is to explore an aspect of culture that merits further analysis as it affects the Army. Using the model of Gerras, Wong and Allen, along with other approaches, it will specifically investigate culture as it pertains to the United States Army Recruiting Command (USAREC). USAREC will be considered exclusively because of its unique mission. It will be argued that USAREC's distinct task of recruiting civilians to serve in an All Volunteer Force (AVF) has produced a culture that is dissimilar to the rest of the Army. Further, it will be argued that this contrast produces significant challenges for the personnel that serve in the command.
To fully analyze USAREC's culture, this paper will first identify the challenges facing recruiters and then provide evidence that prompts concern for the health of USAREC's culture. Second, USAREC's newly developed strategy for implementing cultural change will be reviewed. Third, using models of organizational culture and studies of the Army as a profession, USAREC's strategy for cultural change will be analyzed to determine if there are any gaps in the plan. The paper will conclude with recommendations for USAREC and the Army to consider as Recruiting Command implements its strategy for cultural change.
An Understated Challenge of The Army Recruiter
Over the last 20 years, Americans between the ages of 16-24 years of age have become increasingly less inclined to enlist for military service. 4 Moreover, it has been determined that the Army is the least desirable option of all services for potential recruits of that same target audience. 5 While these issues are significant, they are not the most pressing. As the Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Army stated in the 2008
Army Posture Statement, "We are in an era of persistent conflict." 6 This is the first time in the Army's history where recruitment of an All Volunteer Force (AVF) has been required during protracted war. The war is not only a strain on the Army's combat formations it is also wearing down the will of the American people. According to a recent study, 58% of the key influencers of parents, coaches, peers, and teachers won't recommend military service because of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). 7 As the challenge to meet recruiting goals becomes more difficult, there is greater risk to the Army's ability to continue effective and sustained operations. This is particularly true as the Army plans to increase its numbers of Active Component (AC) forces an additional 65,000 Soldiers 2011. 8 The United States Army recruiter is the leader at the tip of the spear, heading the Army's mission to meet is its manning quotas.  60% did not have a strong feeling of mutual trust and respect.
 55% said their leaders did not inspire loyalty to USAREC.
 50% replied there was not a balance with mission and taking care of Soldiers.
 47% did not feel like an important member of the team due to leader actions. 12 The detachment recruiter feedback was much worse:
 72% did not have a strong feeling of mutual trust and respect  77% said their leaders did not inspire loyalty to USAREC  67% replied there was not a balance with mission and taking care of Soldiers  60% did not feel like an important member of the team due to leader actions 13 Another important factor that may contribute to job dissatisfaction is that most recruiters do not request assignment to USAREC. According to the 2005 JAMRS study on recruiter quality of life only 31% of recruiters requested duty in USAREC. small, seemingly insignificant events may point to important factors that could influence success or failure of an enterprise. 16 The JAMRS and other studies demonstrate possible weak signals that may indicate that assumptions about recruiting could be failing. Significant signposts may be a continued downward trend in recruiter job satisfaction, increased suicide and depression amongst recruiters, higher rates of divorce, and increased attrition of recruiters as they either opt to leave the Army or their careers are ended as a result of poor performance.
Given these conditions, coupled with the perception in the operational Army that recruiting is not a desirable assignment, USAREC recently initiated a strategy to address the problem.
USAREC's Culture of Value
In the US Army Campaign Plan, redefining culture was identified as one of the four components of change in the Army. The plan addresses culture by stating, "We're not fixing it; we (are) making the needed adjustments to keep up with the environment we're in and the missions we're being asked to perform." 17 To address the challenges facing recruiters, USAREC is in the process of implementing cultural change within its organization. The intent of the plan is to attain three goals: USAREC has clearly identified a way ahead to address the challenges of the current recruiting environment with special emphasis on providing a better climate for recruiters to work. The plan identifies methods to enhance the reputation of USAREC as an assignment of choice to attract NCOs to select recruiter duty, rather than being forced into the assignment. The plan focuses on leader development aimed at Eliminate disconnects and increase alignment between incentives and the targeted sales process.
Skills-Based Training
Equip soldiers with the skills they require. As stated by Gerras, Wong and Allen, "real cultural change comes from first ensuring embedding mechanisms are in place." 30 The move to create Army post-like conditions for the recruiters in their communities is an excellent reinforcing mechanism. 31 Edgar Schein posits that reinforcing mechanisms must compliment embedding mechanisms to facilitate cultural change. 32 The "design of physical space, facades, and buildings" as indicated by Schein is a reinforcing mechanism, which, in this case, bolsters the embedding mechanism of "how leaders allocate resources."
However, one aspect of the USAREC's Strategic Plan that should be scrutinized for potential weak signals is the effort to assign more operational Command Sergeant . 33 The Army is also offering bonuses to attract those not inclined to join without a significant economic benefit. 34 Another technique being used is allowing more non-high school graduates to enlist then is normally tolerated. 35 These resources provided to the recruiter eased their burden and allowed the Army to achieve its recruiting mission in 2008. However, leaders should be concerned about second and third order effects of such policies. The Army has always been committed to enlisting quality personnel into its ranks, but the external environment has caused the need for allowances that could potentially have adverse effects on the future readiness of the Army. It is too early to predict the impact that these waivers and attractive financial benefits for voluntary entry into the Army will have on the future force, but the Army must maintain vigilance on signals and signposts of a possible failing assumption.
For the most part USAREC's COV initiative is on track and other programs are gaining traction. Unfortunately, as it will be shown, the larger Army culture and or the institutional bureaucracy are not necessarily embracing the proposed change, which may demonstrate a misalignment of "espoused and enacted values" within the Army.
The six-week Basic Recruiting Course at Fort Jackson, SC provides nine segments of instruction to Corporals and above and there is also a special case consideration for the rank of Specialist. According to the Recruiting School website, "The largest segment is focused on training the student, "… to engage their market, establish their role as a counselor, (and) expand their recruiting network." 36 Other than counseling, most of the skills required to be a recruiter do not easily transfer from those needed to be a successful team or squad leader. An effective recruiter must possess certain innate abilities, and, arguably, a proclivity towards salesmanship. A significant issue is that selection criteria for recruiters do not take into account the unique traits required of a successful salesperson.
The selection criteria for recruiters outlined in Army Regulation 601-1,
Assignment of Enlisted Personnel to the US Army Recruiting Command, do not address
any special skills other than the normal ethical, moral, and physical aptitudes expected of an Army NCO. 37 However, a 2006 RAND study provides greater insight to recruiter selection and productivity. The RAND research showed that level of education and the results of the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) have no significant relationship on recruiter success. Rather, the study revealed younger male NCOs from specific military occupation specialties (MOS) such as intelligence and combat arms and those who had technical skills demonstrated greater effectiveness. Nevertheless, the most interesting finding was that "Unmeasured personal attributes of recruiters account for more of the variation in production levels than do the attributes that we were able to measure." 38 The study concluded by stating, "Potentially important unmeasured attributes are soldiers' talent for selling, their general levels of motivation and energy, and their time-management skills." 39 Additional research reveals more definitive skill required to be a successful recruiter, albeit in the civilian environment.
Writing for ere.net, a highly successful civilian recruiting firm, Jeremy Eskenazi, identifies several skills required to be a successful recruiter. These skills include:
communications skills (written and verbal), relationship skill, project management abilities, the ability to be a strategic partner, a self-starter, political savvy, computer/technology skills, searching, sourcing, and other technical skills, creativity/innovative thinking. 40 (PDRI). The purpose was to develop and refine a screening instrument, using online battery testing, to select Soldiers with high potential for success in recruiting duty. Many of the attributes tested are consistent with the findings of Jeremy Eskenazi. This measure is known as the Noncommissioned Officer Leadership Skills Inventory (NLSI). 42 According to ARI, "The overall objective was to eventually establish a screening process to identify Soldiers who are likely to perform successfully as recruiters and to select these Soldiers for recruiting duty prior to sending them to the recruiter training." 43 The results of the pilot were very favorable:
The results of the validation research demonstrate that the NLSI predicts both individual recruiter production and attrition from recruiter training. Recruiters with higher NLSI scores were more likely to graduate from recruiter training and had higher levels of individual recruiter production in the field. There were no significant mean differences in NLSI scores across race and gender groups, suggesting the use of the NLSI would not result in adverse impact. Other benefits, such as increased levels of job satisfaction, lower levels of stress, and higher quality of life may result from using the NLSI to select those Soldiers best suited for recruiting duty. 44 The NSLI, which is now called the Warrior Asset Inventory (WAI), appears to be exactly the tool USAREC needs to augment the COV initiative to effect cultural change.
Unfortunately, implementation of the NSLI (WAI) has been stalled at the Army Human
Resource Command (HRC) and with the Army G3 staff. According to COL Jim Comish, a senior leader with the USAREC staff, "Even though we have taken steps with the WAI, the reality is that unless it is enforced and unless HRC uses the WAI, we will derive absolutely no benefit. The whole initiative will wind up taking us no where toward the culture change we want." 45 Gerras, Wong and Allen state that "Organizational cultures are not good or bad, right or wrong, they are either aligned or misaligned with the organization's environment." 46 The authors further cite Edgar Schein's work, identifying several embedding mechanisms that create the conditions for cultural change. 47 USAREC identified the WAI as a useful tool to employ the embedding mechanism "how leaders recruit, select, promote, and attrit personnel." Nevertheless, the mechanism may not be integrated into USAREC's COV as a result of a failure of "espoused and enacted value" Defense to conduct a pilot study of contracting out recruiting to civilian firms for a period of five years, which was eventually extended an additional two years. The 10 contract recruiting companies were given the same resources as the Army recruiting companies and worked under the same rules and regulations. 58 At the conclusion of the pilot, the summary report revealed that most of the contract recruiting companies fell short in effectiveness compared to the Army recruiting companies. However, the report also states,
While the overall production of the ten contract companies during the test years has remained below the control companies, contract recruiting has still proven itself to be a viable recruiting option. At least half of the individual companies have consistently performed well within the range of performance of the uniformed control companies. This speaks well for contract recruiting, since this was accomplished despite the problems of high turnover and a less-than-friendly recruiting market, all while establishing a new business. It is therefore recommended that contract recruiting in some form (to include integrated contract recruiting) be continued after the end of the pilot test on September 30, 2007. The mode and extent of contract recruiting should be left to senior Army decisionmakers for the widest possible flexibility to insure maximum efficiency and effectiveness. The lessons learned from the failures and successes of the 10 Contract Company Pilot Test will serve the Army well in exercising this option. 59 After further analysis a hybrid of this model is being considered. According to
Colonel Jim Comish at USAREC, a more viable option is to employ Government Service (GS) civilians, rather than contractors. Comish explains that, "Mixing NCOs with GS civilians is the direction we want to go. Why GS versus contractors? The contractors cost more and attrit at much higher rates. The NCOs will prospect and conduct Army Interviews. The civilians will process and manage our future Soldiers until they ship to Basic Training." 60 Comish further elaborates that USAREC is currently conducting a pilot across the 3rd Recruiting Brigade breaking out the roles and having recruiters specialize in the roles. The team is rewarded as opposed to holding recruiters accountable for all roles. Feedback from the recruiters reveals they liked the team concept (supporting clan culture) although production has remained much the same. At the same time, if recruiters like it better and are more comfortable working as a team, then that contributes to Culture of Value. USAREC is also piloting contractors performing roles other than production. The intent is that the concept will prove worthwhile and will lead to a pilot involving a mix of Army NCOs, contractors and GS civilians by role.
Conclusion and Recommendations
The purpose of this paper was to examine the culture of USAREC To further promote the expansion of the 79R population of recruiters, USAREC should be watchful of their effort to assign more operational CSMs into the organization.
USAREC should maintain vigilance for weak signals that may demonstrate an adverse effect on morale of 79R NCOs who may inspire to serve at the CSM level within USAREC.
USAREC must continue its effort to find the right mix of Army recruiters, GS civilians and contractors to form a recruiting team that is task organized to perform the roles and functions in accordance with the abilities of the personnel. The Army must support this initiative and continue to fund pilot tests to confirm or deny proof of concept.
